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The Right of Publicity: Dispelling Survivability,
Preemption and First Amendment Myths
Threatening to Eviscerate a
Recognized State Right
MICHAEL J. MCLANE*
© 1983
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the "right of publicity" has been recognized in a
growing number of jurisdictions.' The growth of this right, which
at this time derives primarily from state common law,2 has recur-
rently been threatened by a number of fears, the most prominent
of which involve how the right is created,3 whether it is assignable
and devisable,4 whether the right is preempted under the Copy-
right Act,5 and most recently, whether it is eviscerated by first
amendment interests. 6
This Article will focus on all of these concerns, and will advo-
cate recognition of the right of publicity, regardless of whether it is
exploited while living;7 that the right should be fully assignable
* Senior Law Clerk, New Hampshire Superior Court. B.B.A., Siena College,
1980; J.D., Boston College Law School, 1983. Member, Massachusetts Bar. The au-
thor wishes to thank Massachusetts Superior Court Judge Hiller B. Zobel for his help-
ful comments on the original draft of the article.
1. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Heritage Prod., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga. 1981), rev'dper curiam, 694 F.2d
674 (1lth Cir. 1983); Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969); Haelen
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc.
v. American Heritage Prod., Inc., 250 Ga. 135, 296 S.E.2d 697 (1982); Lombardo v.
Doyle, Dane & Bembach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. App. Div.
1977); see also Comment, The Right of Publicity vs. The FirstAmendment; Reconciling
the Conflict Between a Proprietary Interest of the Plaintiff and the Constitutional Guar-
antee of Free Speech, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1205, 1206 nn.5-6 (1981-82) [hereinafter cited
as Comment, Conflict]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977). what has
been lacking is a precise definition of the limits of "this right which does exist and has
existed for a long time-much longer than the right of privacy." Pilpel, The Right of
Publici
, 
27 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y OF U.S.A. 249, 263 (1980) [hereinafter cited asPilpel, Publicity.
2. But see N.Y. (Civ. RIGHTS) LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney Supp. 1982-83), pro-
tecting living persons from commercial exploitation of their names and likenesses
without consent, in the form of a statutory right of privacy.
3. See infra § I.
4. See infra § II.
5. See infra § III.
6. See infra § IV.
7. See infra § I.
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and devisable;8 that the right is not preempted by the Copyright
Act;9 and that the protection afforded the media for use of a per-
son's name, likeness or characteristics should only extend to news-
worthy information.' 0
I. THE CREATION OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
Courts currently do not apply a uniform test to discern whether
a person has acted adequately to create a right of publicity while
living. The possible range of tests include: whether a person has
created a business to market his name or likeness in areas other
than the person's primary area of activity;' whether a person has
exploited his name or likeness while living, without creating a
business for this purpose in areas other than the person's primary
area of activity;12 whether a person has recognized the value of the
right of publicity merely by entering into the person's primary
area of activity;' 3 and recently, whether the person exploited the
right of publicity while living was found to be totally unnecessary
to creation of the right.14 These varying tests are mirrored in the
widely divergent views of commentators. 15
8. See infra § II.
9. See infra § III.
10. See infra§ IV.
11. See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr.
323 (1979).
12. See Bi-Rite Enterprises, Inc. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1198-99
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 228, 232
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
13. This category includes cases where a person actually contracted concerning
the use of a name or likeness in the person's primary area of activity, see Hicks v.
Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 429-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); and where no such
contracts were ever entered into, see Groucho Marx Prod., Inc. v. Day & Night Co.,
523 F. Supp. 485, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982) (applying
California Law). But see Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc, v.
American Heritage Prod., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854, 865 (N.D. Ga. 1981), re"dper
curiam, 694 F.2d 674 (1Ith Cir. 1983), where, although Hicks was cited as authority,
Dr. King's accepting honoraria for the use of his name, likeness and literary composi-
tions, as well as his sale of copyrights to several speeches, did not show a purpose to
establish his personality as a commercial commodity.
14. See Martin Luther King, Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heri-
tage Prod., Inc., 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam), where the court relied on
answers to certified questions to the Supreme Court of Georgia in Martin Luther
King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prod.. Inc., 250 Ga.
135, 296 S.E.2d 697 (1982).
15. "[I]t should not matter from the standpoint of the right of publicity whether
the person is a public figure or not, nor should it matter if he is a public figure, he has
exercised his right of publicity during his lifetime." Pilpel, Publicity, supra note 1, at
257. Accord Note, An Assessment of the Commercial Exploitation Requirement as a
Limit on the Right of Publicity, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1703, 1717 (1983). Compare Sims,
Right of Publicity" Survivabili&y Reconsidered, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 479 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Sims, Survivabilitj: "A celebrity may perceive his fame as predi-
cated in part on the projection of a public image that might be undermined by pro-
3
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Another area of concern is whether the right of publicity should
exist only in the names, likenesses and characteristics of celebri-
ties. Although there appears to be less of a policy consideration
16
in allowing creation of the right without exploitation to encourage
creativity among noncelebrities who are as yet "undiscovered," it
is nonetheless unfair not to compensate even the "unknown" for
the unauthorized use of his name, likeness or characteristics. Pre-
sumably, such use would not occur unless the name, likeness or
characteristic had some value, which should be ascertained by the
parties:
The rationale for [protecting the right of publicity] is the
straightforward one of preventing unjust enrichment by the
theft of good will. No social purpose is served by having the
defendant get free some aspect of the plaintiff that would have
market value and for which he would normally pay. 17
Thus, it would be unfair to allow the celebrity to enjoy the bene-
fits of the right of publicity, while denying these same benefits to
the noncelebrity.
It is likewise arbitrary to require some type of overt exploitation
by a living person in order to create a right of publicity, be it by
incorporating a business to license property rights, by contracting
to create commercial items, such as posters, utilizing publicity
rights, or even by only requiring that a person show he or she
knew of the right's existence by contracting to protect publicity
rights in noncommercial items, such as the right to portray a par-
ticular character.' 8
moting commercial products." Id (footnote omitted); Treece, Commercial
Exploitation ofNames, Likenesses, and Personal Histories, 51 TEx. L. REv. 637, 651-52
(1973): "A noncelebrity can establish the going rate for endorsements by other
noncelebrities, or the going rate for models or actors who lend their personalities to
commercial advertisements." Id. (footnote omitted). Accord Comment, The Right of
Publicity as a Means of Protecting Performers' Style, 14 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 129, 132
n.22 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Style]. But see Rader, The "Right ofPub-
licity'l-A New Dimension, 61 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 228, 233 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Rader, New Dimension] (stating that the right of publicity is only created by exploita-
tion, and a private individual fails to create the right by associating his or her name or
likeness with a product because these are usually without commercial value) and
Felcher & Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal ofReal People by the Media, 88
YALE L.J. 1577, 1591 n.78 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Felcher & Rubin, Portraya]:
"Because the right of publicity rests on the idea of damage to property of demon-
strated economic worth, it does not extend to the misappropriation of a person's name
or likeness when that person has not previously exploited these attributes in some
commercial manner." Id
16. See infra notes 31-52 and accompanying text.
17. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977)
(quoting Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law--Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 331 (1966)).
18. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text. This last test should inevitably
result in a court finding a right of publicity. See Groucho Marx Prod., Inc. v. Day &
Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982):
1984]
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The courts draw fine distinctions between what is and is not
sufficient exploitation. In Lugosi v. Universal Pictures,19 the court
acknowledged the assignability of the right of publicity, stating
that "[a]ssignment of the right . . by the 'owner' thereof is sy-
nonymous with its exercise. '' 20 The fact that Lugosi had actually
assigned the right to use his name and likeness to promote the film
Dracula was not sufficient. The court would only protect those
commercial situations actually affected by Lugosi's assignment,
which it found did not include the use of the character Dracula in
a film made after his death.21 This type of burden on the right-
holder, which requires foresight as to what future uses "pirates"
may make of one's name, likeness or characteristics, is unduly
restrictive.22
It is also possible for courts to confuse even the exploitation
standards already in force. In Martin Luther King, Jr., Centerfor
Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Products, Inc.,23 (King 1),
the district court did not determine whether Georgia would recog-
nize the devisability of the right of publicity, because the rule
emerging from case law was that the right must have been ex-
ploited.24 Although Dr. King accepted honoraria for the use of
his name, likeness, and literary compositions, and sold copyrights
to several speeches to Motown Records Corporation, 25 the court
found that it was not Dr. King's "purpose" to establish his person-
ality as a commercial commodity.26
The better view is found in Martin Luther King, Jr., Centerfor
Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Products, Inc.,27 (King
II), where the eleventh circuit relied on the Georgia Supreme
Court's ruling that "the appropriation of another's name and like-
ness. . . is a tort in Georgia, whether the person whose name and
likeness is used is a private citizen, entertainer, or as here a public
"Every appearance, contract and advertisement involving the Marx Brothers signified
recognition by the performers of the unique characters they portrayed."
19. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
20. Id. at 823, 603 P.2d at 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
21. Id
22. If a test for exploitation should be required at all, the proper determination
should be whether one's name, likeness or characteristics have been exploited, not
whether a particular commercial area has been exploited. See Comment, Style, supra
note 15, at 135-36 n.36.
23. 508 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
24. Id at 864.
25. See, e.g., King v. Mister Maestro, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
26. King 1at 865.
27. 694 F.2d 674 (11 th Cir. 1983) (per curiam), relying on answers to certified
questions to the Supreme Court of Georgia in Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for
Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prod., Inc., 250 Ga. 135, 296 S.E.2d 697
(1982).
[Vol. 20
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figure who is not a public official."2 8 The court further found that
the right of publicity need not be exploited while the person is
alive:29 "In our view, a person who avoids exploitation during life
is entitled to have his image protected against exploitation after
death just as much if not more than a person who exploited his
image during life."'30
The right of publicity should not be forfeited because a person
while living avoids commercial exploitation. A person may fail to
exploit his name, likeness or characteristics for a variety of rea-
sons: as a means of maintaining a proper public image; for the
purpose of letting the right of publicity appreciate in value, or,
failing to assign the right may be due to a mere oversight. In addi-
tion, one whose right has not yet been exploited may suffer an
untimely death. To avoid unjust enrichment, the right should ex-
ist in all persons; if it has in fact been infringed the question of
value should be left to a proper determination of damages.
II. THE ASSIGNABILITY AND DEVISABILITY OF THE RIGHT
Ordinarily, once a court finds that the right of publicity was
exploited sufficiently during life,31 it will deem the right devisa-
ble.32 Again, however, courts and commentators disagree.
28. King II at 680.
29. Id. at 682-83.
30. Id. at 683 (footnote omitted).
31. See supra notes 11-30 and accompanying text.
32. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 221 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979), rev'd, 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981) (applying Tennessee
law and deferring to the sixth circuit's interpretation of same in Memphis Dev.
Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 958 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
953 (1980); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981); Martin Lu-
ther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prod., Inc., 694
F.2d 674 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (per curiam), relying on answers to certified questions to the
Supreme Court of Georgia in 250 Ga. 135, 296 S.E.2d 697 (1982). But see Memphis
Dev., 616 F.2d at 958; Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160
Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979); accord Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prod., 25 Cal. 3d 860,
603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979) (right not descendible). But see Reeves v.
United Artists, 572 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Ohio 1983), where the court did not decide
the exploitation question. The court relied upon Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad-
casting Co., 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 351 N.E.2d 454 (1976), rev'd on other grounds, 433
U.S. 562 (1977), for the proposition that the Ohio Supreme Court had "specifically
rejected the notion that the right of publicity was a property right. Rather, it declared
the right of publicity was more closely aligned with the right of privacy." Reeves, 572
F. Supp. at 1235. The court placed too much emphasis on the Ohio Supreme Court's
reconition that the right of publicity was originally a form of "invasion of the right
of privacy by appropriation." Zacchini, 47 Ohio St. 2d at 226, 351 N.E.2d at 456. The
Ohio Supreme Court had actually been quite aware that "the 'privacy' which the
performer seeks is personal control over commercial display and exploitation of his
personality and the exercise of his talents." Id at 231, 351 N.E.2d at 459. The ques-
tion of survivability was not before the Ohio Supreme Court in Zacchini Whatever
the ultimate decision on this issue by the Ohio court might be, the writer is convinced
that the court recognized the difference between the right of publicity and the other
6
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Three arguments exist which support the denial of the
survivability of the right of publicity: 1) survivability of the right
is not always deserved; 2) the survivability of the right is not war-
ranted by policy considerations; and finally, 3) that the courts
should maintain a hands-off posture regarding the development
of the right.
That the survivability of the right is not always deserved was a
spectre raised in Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors Etc.,
Inc.,33 where the district court had enjoined further distribution of
eight-inch pewter replicas of Elvis Presley by the Memphis Devel-
opment Foundation, a nonprofit corporation.34 The court of ap-
peals concluded that "the right of publicity should not be given
the status of a devisable right, even where as here a person ex-
ploits the right by contract during life."' 35 The court was con-
cemed that fame "may be created by bad as well as good
conduct." 36
This argument can be countered by the fact that the financial
benefits of such a right could ultimately inure to victims of the
infamous person. 37 However, this answer is too narrow. Finan-
cial benefits may also inure to innocent family members or lega-
tees of the right holder. Moreover, Anglo-American
jurisprudence has for quite some time recognized that even the
conviction of a felony has not meant that one's property escheats
to the sovereign.38
That policy considerations do not support the survivability of
the right, even when exploited during life, was another theory ad-
vanced in Memphis Development.39 It "seem[ed] apparent" to the
court "that making the right of publicity inheritable would not
branches of the right to privacy, as opposed to the district court's conclusion in Reeves
that the right of publicity is not descendible in Ohio, "[i]n light of the Ohio Supreme
Court's clear language linking the right of publicity more closely to the right of pri-
vacy than to a property right." Reeves, 572 F. Supp. at 1235.
33. 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
34. Id. at 957.
35. Id at 958.
36. Id at 959.
37. In the Memphis court's final rationale that infamy could be the basis of
a valuable right of publicity, the court ignored the fact that the financial
benefits of such a right could ultimately inure to the benefit of the victims of
the infamous acts or their survivors. For example, New York has enacted
Section 632-a of the Executive Law [N.Y. Exec. Law § 632-a (1977)] which
provides restitution to victims of crime from payments received by the per-
petrators who exercise their rights of publicity.
Comment, The Right of Publicity: Premature Burialfor California Property Rights in
the Wake of Lugosi, 12 PAC. L.J. 987, 994 (1981) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited
as Comment, Premature Buria.
38. See generally C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROP-
ERTY 21-22 (1979).
39. 616 F.2d at 958.
[Vol. 20
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significantly inspire the creative endeavors of individuals in our
society."40 This conclusion was reached despite the court's recog-
nition that Elvis Presley "worked to create the asset, with, per-
haps, the hope of devising it. ''41
It appears evident to this writer that, generally, "the protection
provides an economic incentive for [performers] to make the in-
vestment required to produce a performance of interest to the
public."42 This incentive is bolstered by the fact that a right of
publicity is survivable.43 For various reasons previously dis-
cussed, 44 not all holders of the right will exercise it while living.
For these people, the survivability of the right may be the most
valuable aspect of it. To say that a person will not be further mo-
tivated to attain notoriety because a valuable asset will be added
to the person's estate runs counter to the notion that people accu-
mulate personal property for their legatees or heirs as well as for
themselves.45
Another argument in opposition to the survivability of the right
of publicity is that courts should be hesitant in defining the perim-
eters of the right. The reluctance of the courts to define the limits
of the right is not surprising given the fact that commentators' the-
ories have ranged from permitting courts to set the outer limits of
the right,46 or advocating a fifty year period of survivability,47 to
the other end of the spectrum, calling for only a five to ten year
period of survivability in legislation approved by Congress pursu-
40. Id. at 959.
41. Id at 960.
42. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977).
43. Of course by noting such events as the aftermath of John Lennon's
death, the courts should recognize that the right of publicity has value in the
marketplace even after death. The recognition of this value, then, should
lead the courts to bestow the label of "property" on the right of publicity,
even after the death of the artist.
Comment, Premature Burial, supra note 37, at 1000 (footnote omitted).
44. See supra notes 11-30 and accompanying text.
45. Compare Felcher & Rubin, Portrayal, supra note 15, at 1619:
Of course, the possibility of providing for one's heirs may have a motiva-
tional effect during one's life. But given the present state of the law, it is
possible for a person to establish a bona fide contract to profit from his
attributes during his life, and to leave the proceeds to his heirs. The fact that
he did not do so indicates that he was not particularly concerned with using
and devising this asset, and that such concerns were not a substantial moti-
vation during his life.
The authors defend survivability in general in Felcher & Rubin, The Descendibility of
the Right of Publicity: Is There Commercial Lfe After Death, 89 YALE L.J. 1125
(1980).
46. See Comment, Premature Burial, supra note 37, at 1007.
47. Note, The Right ofPublicity Revisited" Reconciling Fame, Fortune, and Consti-
tutional Rights, 62 B.U.L. Rav. 965, 1000 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Reconciling].
19841
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ant to its Commerce Clause powers.4 8
The life-plus-fifty-years period of survivability is the best
choice. The United States Supreme Court has noted the similari-
ties between copyright law and the right of publicity.4 9 Addition-
ally, Chief Justice Bird of the California Supreme Court adopted
this time limit in her dissent in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures,50 and
it is proposed by the court in Estate of Presley v. Russen.5 I
The "parade of horrors" conjured up by the sixth circuit in
Memphis Development should not retard the growth of the right of
publicity;52 it is a property right, and should be survivable. The
survivability of the right, similar to the survivability of copyright,
ensures increased incentives and productivity within our society.
As the right is originally a creature of common law, there is no
reason why state courts as well as federal courts applying state law
should not be free to define the perimeters of the right, and to
limit it to a fifty year period after the death of the creator.
III. THE EFFECT OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT ON THE RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY
Although various aspects of the right of publicity are similar to
those found in copyright law,53 the right of publicity is not pre-
48. Sims, Survivabiliy, supra note 15, at 455, 498. See also Note, Torts-Right of
Publicity--Famous Persons Right of Publicity is Descendible-The Needfor a Dura-
tional Limit on the Right oPublicity--Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v. Day & Night
Co., 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982), 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 190, 208-10 (1983); Ausness,
The Right of Publicity.. A "Haystack in a Hurricane,"55 TEMP. L.Q. 977, 1025 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Ausness, Haystack].
49. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576-77 (1977).
50. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissent-
ing): "A prominent person has a substantial economic interest in controlling com-
mercial use of his name and likeness. This is entitled to protection under the common
law and should be inheritable by an individual's heirs and protected for 50 years after
the individual's death." Id. at 828, 603 P.2d at 434, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 332.
51. 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1355 n.10 (D.N.J. 1981). The court suggested the New
Jersey state legislature set a durational limit on the right of publicity, and proposed
the Federal Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 305 as providing informative guidelines.
But see Ropski, Further Comments on the Development of the Right of Publicity-A
Matter of Lfe, Death and Sometimes the First Amendment, 73 TRADEMARK REP. 278,
283-84 (1983) (arguing that the right of publicity, like a trademark right, should be
protectible as long as assignees or heirs assert or commercially exploit the right).
52. See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 284 (2d Cir. 1981)
(Mansfield, J., dissenting). Judge Mansfield, disagreeing that the sixth circuit's pro-
mulgation of Tennessee law should be controlling, described the "parade of horrors"
conjured up by the sixth circuit as "unreal." Id. at 287. Judge Mansfield also ap-
proved of limiting the right of publicity's duration by analogy to the copyright statute.
Id. at 288. See also Commerce Union Bank v. Coors of Cumberland, Inc., 7 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 2204 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1981).
53. For example, the "fair use" exception to copyright incorporated into 17
U.S.C. § 107 (1982) is comparable to the "incidental use" of one's right of publicity.
See Hoffman, The Right of Publicity-Heirs' Right, Advertisers' Windfall, or Courts'
9
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empted by it. The Federal Copyright Act54 protects artistic cre-
ations.5 5 However, copyright protection is limited to works fixed
by a tangible medium of expression.5 6 One's persona, in all its
varying aspects, is incapable of reduction to tangible form.57 Ar-
guments that one's persona may be captured in various tangible
media and therefore may be protected by the Copyright Act re-
veal a fundamental misconception of the nature and extent of the
Act's protection.58
Nightmare?, 31 DE PAUL L. REv. 1 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Hoffman, Courts'
Nightmare]; Ausness, Haystack, supra note 47, at 1048-53; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 652C Comment d (1977). In Note, Copyright and the Right of Publicity:
One Pea in Two Pods?, 71 GEo L.J. 1567, 1576 n.79 (1983), the author states that:
Copyright... rewards only the individual's own work rather than giving
that individual a right to share in the proceeds of all works that involve him.
Thus, if a person wants to learn about Watergate, but feels that contributing
to the Watergate conspirator's welfare is wrong, he can buy John Sirica's
book rather than G. Gordon Liddy's.
The concern expressed in the Note, that unsavory characters will benefit by exerting
the right of publicity where their names appear in a work, ignores the fact that adop-
tion of the fair use exception would prevent the right of publicity from violating every
copyrighted work.
54. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982).
55. Id. at § 102(a).
56. Id. See 1 M. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.08(C) (2d ed. 1978) [hereinafter
cited as NIMMER].
57. "The doctrines [of copyright and right of publicity] are not, however, identi-
cal. . . . The interest created under the right of publicity is the person's individual
style-his persona-which need not become tangibly fixed in a medium of expres-
sion." Shipley, Publicity Never Dies.- It Just Fades Awa- The Right of Publicity and
FederalPreemption, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 673, 684 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Shipley,
Preemption].
In Professor Shipley's article he states that "[iut is uncertain whether copyright pro-
tection extends to characters. . . . If, however, federal copyright protection is avail-
able .... then concurrent state protection under the right of publicity might be
preempted." Id. at 700. See also Ausness, Haystack, supra note 47, at 1022-23. But
see Kulzick & Hogue, Chilled Bird: Freedom of Expression in the Eighties, 14 Loy.
L.A.L. REv. 57, 59 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Kulzick & Hogue, ChilledBiral (law of
copyright generally does not protect characters from infringement).
The case cited by Professor Shipley that found characters to be protected under
copyright, Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1978),
relied on a longstanding exception to the general rule, allowing protection for comic
characters, which can be fixed in a pictorial medium. See also Ausness, Haystack,
supra note 47, at 1022.
58. The Copyright Act only protects original artistic works from reproduction.
See, e.g., Gross v. Seligman, 212 F. 930, 931 (2d Cir. 1914): "Of course when the first
picture has been reproduced and copyrighted every other artist is entirely free to form
his conception. . . and to avail of the same young woman's services in making it
permanent, whether he works with pigments or a camera."
Although Professor Shipley is correct in stating that a film of Zacchini's human
cannonball act, or a photograph of a baseball star in Haelen Laboratories, Inc. v.
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953), would be an original work
under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (1982), he is incorrect in concluding: "[Plaintiffs right in
Haelen] to control the use of these likenesses was susceptible to infringement either by
reproduction of the photographs themselves, a copyright infringement, or by the dis-
tribution of completely different photographs." Shipley, Preemption, supra note 57, at
714. Cf. Ausness, Haystack, supra note 47, at 1021-22, where the author likewise con-
10
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Another argument for preemption of the right of publicity is
that the copyright holder will not be able to sell a copyrighted
work which depicts an individual if the right of publicity allows
an individual exclusive control over his name, likeness and char-
acteristics.5 9 However, free-wheeling use of a person's name or
likeness for commercial purposes was denied long before the right
of publicity was even recognized.60 It would be anomalous to al-
low a person to circumvent the right of publicity merely by ob-
taining a copyright in a work containing a person's likeness. Such
a use of the copyright laws would serve to eviscerate the right of
publicity.61
The right of publicity, although analogous to copyright, differs
in that one's persona cannot be placed in a fixed medium. Thus,
the right is not protected under the Copyright Act, and is not pre-
empted by the Act. As the right of publicity can be nullified by
fuses the reproduction of a copyright work and the reproduction of the non-copy-
rightable "likeness" of a person.
Professor Shipley lost sight of his own recognition that "[t]he copyrightable expres-
sion would be the recording or filming of the act, not the live act itself." Id. at 710
n.258 (quoting NIMMER, supra note 56, at § 1.08(C), at 1-51). Anyone would be free
under the copyright law to make his or her own film of Zacchini's act or photograph
of a person. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903),
where Mr. Justice Holmes, for the Court, stated: "Others are free to copy the original.
They are not free to copy the copy."
59. See Comment, Style, supra note 15, at 141, noting the preemption discussion
in Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 906 (1971):
Such a conclusion [that copyright preempts the right of publicity] clearly
fails to recognize the simple fact that by according the protection requested,
a licensee would in no way be prohibited from securing the rights to use the
song, only from using the distinctive expression of it as created by someone
else.
See also Rader, New Dimension, supra note 15, at 243.
60. N.Y. (Civ. RIGHTS) LAw §§ 50-51 (McKinney Supp. 1982-83); see also cases
collected in Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1105, 1107-08
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
61. Consider for example the argument in Ausness, Haystack, supra note 47, at
1023, that a poster displaying a single frame from a copyrighted movie is a "deriva-
tive work" under 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). The author is incorrect in asserting that
such a poster would be a work "based upon one or more preexisting works" under 17
U.S.C. § 101. A photograph is a protected original work under 17 U.S.C. § 102(1982). See DeCosta v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 520 F.2d 499, 511 (1st
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 50) (1947)). See also
Edison v. Lubin, 122 F. 240, 241 (3d Cir. 1903), where an exact photographic repro-
duction was made of the copyrighted material.
The answer is clear as to who should prevail when a photograph is created from a
copyright negative without permission. This does not mean, however, that the owner
of a motion picture should be able to create posters from a copyrighted film without
the permission of a person depicted in them under the guise that they are "derivative
works" automatically protected. The work as a whole would be protected, as an orig-
inal work, as between its creator and all others. The creator, however, would have to
bargain with a person depicted, or filmmakers would be able to seriously dilute the
value of a person's right to grant licenses to display posters.
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strict enforcement of the Copyright Act, courts should give the
right of publicity priority when a copyright holder attempts to cir-
cumvent the right by utilizing the federal system of registering
copyrighted works.
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
First amendment and right of publicity interests were balanced
in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting, Inc.,62 where an en-
tertainer's "human cannonball" act was filmed in its entirety.63
The Supreme Court of Ohio had decided that the newscasts of the
act were privileged, unless the actual intent of the station was to
appropriate the publicity for some private use, or unless the sta-
tion intended to injure the individual.64
The Supreme Court in Zacchini discussed Time, Inc. v. Hill,65
where the plaintiffs sued for invasion of privacy.66 The plaintiffs
had been held hostage for nineteen hours in 1952, but were re-
leased unharmed. 67 Life magazine's story on a play written about
the incident indicated that the play accurately represented acts of
violence that never actually occurred. 68 Although the plaintiffs
were portrayed as courageous, they sued under a New York stat-
ute69 protecting even a "newsworthy person" 70 from a "ficti-
tious"'71 report. The Court applied the New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan72 requirement that defendant publish the article with
knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth to
"false light" privacy cases.73
Hill was distinguished in Zacchini as involving "an entirely dif-
ferent tort from the 'right of publicity' recognized by the Ohio
Supreme Court." 74 The Court noted the importance of the differ-
ences between the two torts; first, that invasion of privacy protects
injury to feelings, whereas the right of publicity protects a person's
62. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
63. Id. at 564. See Quinn & Warren, Professional Team Sports New LegalAren"
Television and the Players's Right of Publicity, 16 IND. L. REV. 487 (1983) for a discus-
sion of how Zacchini may apply to the rights of team sports athletes in television and
cable television broadcasts.
64. 433 U.S. at 565 (citing 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 352 N.E.2d 454, 455 (1976)).
65. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
66. Id. at 378.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 377-78.
69. N.Y. (Civ. RIGHTS) LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney Supp. 1982-83).
70. 385 U.S. at 384.
71. Id.
72. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
73. Hill, 385 U.S. at 387-88.
74. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 571.
19841
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proprietary interest in encouraging entertainment; and second,
that the two torts markedly differ:
in the degree to which they intrude on dissemination of infor-
mation to the public. In "false light" cases the only way to pro-
tect the interests involved is to attempt to minimize publication
of the damaging matter, while in "right of publicity" cases the
only question is who gets to do the publishing. . . . Indeed, in
the present case petitioner did not seek to enjoin the broadcast
of his act; he simply sought compensation for the broadcast in
the form of damages.75
It is rather striking that this distinction has not been noted by
those postulating that the goals of the first amendment will be
frustrated by right-of-publicity suits, because the public will be
denied access to various forms of entertainment. 76 Nonetheless,
the Court has clearly pointed out that the first factor to be consid-
ered in evaluating a potential conflict between the first amend-
ment and the right of publicity is "that neither the public nor [the
television station] will be deprived of the benefit of [Zacchini's]
performance as long as his commercial stake in his act is appropri-
ately recognized. '77
75. Id. at 573. Even in the face of Zacchini, some commentators insist upon ap-
plying the New York Times standard to publicity cases. See, e.g., Ausness, Haystack,
supra note 47, at 1036-41. In Haystack, the case of Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 18
N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1966), vacated, 387 U.S. 239 (1967),
aI'd on remand, 21 N.Y.2d 124, 233 N.E.2d 840, 286 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1967), appeal
dismissed, 393 U.S. 1046 (1969), was termed a "false light privacy case." Ausness,
Haystack, supra note 47, at 1038. This writer, however, has been unable to locate the
unfavorable element of the material invented about Warren Spahn. Nor is it true that
there is "considerable social value in entertainment, but there is none in deception."
Id. at 1041 n.48. The court in Spahn I1 indicated that the "lively" method of por-
trayal used by the defendant author may well have been more entertaining to his
youthful audience. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d at 128, 233 N.E.2d at
842-43, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 835. The case makes sense only in a right of publicity con-
text, for, as J. Bergan noted in dissent, applying the New York Times standard was of
little aid in a case involving more than the reckless disregard of truth. "Fiction is the
conscious antithesis of truth." Id at 131, 233 N.E.2d at 845, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 838.
76. See, e.g., Felcher & Rubin, Portrayal, supra note 15, at 1595; Note, Recon-
ciling, supra note 47, at 979, 992-93. But see Comment, Conflict, supra note 1, at 1223:
"In sum, Zacehini represents an important milestone in the development of publicity
law because it embodies Supreme Court recognition of a property-based right of pub-
licity, and because it resulted in Supreme Court validation of a particular publicity
claim in the face of a typically fatal first amendment challenge."
77. Zacchini 433 U.S. at 578. Commentators go to great lengths to attempt to
minimize the force of Zacchini. One commentator suggests that Zacchinimay be con-
sistent with Man v. Warner Bros., 317 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), as Zacchini based
his entire living on his act, which was broadcast in whole, whereas Man gave a "brief
and spontaneous performance," which the court characterized as de minimis. Aus-
ness, Haystack, supra note 47, at 1036 (citing Man, 317 F. Supp. at 53). Even assum-
ing Man suffered less damage than Zacchini, both performances were brief (if not
spontaneous in Zacchini's case), and the appropriation of Man's entire performance,
at forty-five seconds exactly three times the length of Zacchini's, is no less offensive
because it was small in proportion to the entirety of the motion picture "Woodstock"
[Vol. 20
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It is unlikely that the continued vitality of the right of publicity
will result in any more than a de minimis restriction on first
amendment goals. The power of the market was duly noted in
cases such as Haelen Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum,
Inc.,78 and Zacchin 79 Individuals will, for the most part, be
happy to be paid for their performances and portrayals. A live
person already has the power to enjoin certain injurious publica-
tions.8 0 Finally, the survivability of the right of publicity gives
heirs, legatees and assignees the right for a limited time to monitor
uses of a decedent's name, likeness and characteristics. In cases
not involving a newsworthiness privilege,81 the media will have to
be more circumspect than it is under current privacy law. At pres-
ent, anything may be said about a decedent, and a privacy cause
of action, which dies with the decedent, may not be brought by the
next of kin.82
Some courts that have considered the conflict between first
amendment goals and the right of publicity have reached incor-
rect results.83 Others have reached correct results, while not nec-
essarily for the right reasons.84 When examining these cases, one
must realize that a liberal attitude toward the first amendment8 5
than the appropriation in Zacchiniwas because his act was small in proportion to the
full newscast.
78. "For it is common knowledge that many prominent persons..., far from
having their feelings bruised through public exposure of their likenesses, would feel
sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing advertisements,
popularizing their countenances." Haelen Laboratories, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d
Cir. 1953).
79. "[Zacchini] does not seek to enjoin the broadcast of his performance; he sim-
ply wants to be paid for it." Zacchini 433 U.S. 562, 578.
80. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 804 (4th ed. 1971).
81. See infra notes 141-61 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., Young v. That Was The Week That Was, 312 F. Supp. 1337, 1341
(N.D. Ohio 1969), affdper curiam, 423 F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1970).
83. See Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Gug-
lielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prod., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal Rptr. 352
(1979) (Bird, C.J., concurring).
84. See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 652
F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981); Groucho Marx Prod., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp.
485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982); Estate of Presley v. Russen,
513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981); Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 521 F.
Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v.
American Heritage Prod., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga. 1981), rev'dper curam,
694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983); and Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 496 F.
Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
85. The primary goal of the first amendment freedom of speech is to prevent the
government from suppressing ideas it may disapprove of. Thus, Voltaire's legendary
quote: "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say
it," was cited with approval in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50,
63 (1976).
The maintenance of the democratic process is furthered by a privilege for news-
worthy information. See Sims, Survivability, supra note 15, at 1597. "The flow of
14
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can coexist with the right of publicity.
Three categories of cases involving the right of publicity have
been identified. They involve, respectively, newsworthy informa-
tion, entertainment, and commercial products.8 6 These categories
are not mutually exclusive, however. Courts seeking to protect the
right of publicity have often forced a case into the "commercial"
category, because a "purely commercial" use of a person's name,
likeness or characteristics is generally not entitled to first amend-
ment protection.87
It is difficult, however, to find a case where the "purely com-
mercial" use of a person's name, likeness or characteristics does
not contain a creative element sufficient to move the case into the
entertainment category. In King 1,88 the defendant hired an artist
to create the mold of a plastic bust of Dr. King.89 Nevertheless,
no first amendment claims were raised either in King I or on
appeal.90
In Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc.,91 the medium of ex-
pression was a magazine article containing "erotic and nude pho-
tographs of purportedly well-known actresses, ' 92 which might be
found to be informative or entertaining by a certain portion of the
community. Nonetheless, the court found that Chuckleberry's
misuse of plaintiff's name was not protected as reporting an infor-
mational or newsworthy event.93
In Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.,94 the defendant argued
that its poster of the recently deceased Elvis Presley was a news-
worthy event.95 Factors cited Paulsen v. Personality Posters,
Inc.,96 where the court refused to enjoin the sale of a Pat Paulsen
"FOR PRESIDENT" poster.97 The court in Paulsen reasoned
that the comedian's choice of the political arena for satire made
information essential to a free society must be supported by a privilege of newswor-
thiness so that information sought by the public is freely available." See also Kulzick
& Hogue, Chilled Bird, supra note 57, at 58.
86. See generally Felcher & Rubin, Portrayal, supra note 15.
87. Id. at 1606; Rader, New Dimension, supra note 15, at 241.
88. 508 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga. 1981), rev'dper curiam, 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir.
1983).
89. Id. at 856.
90. "The defendants in the case now before us make no claim under [first
amendment] freedoms and we find no violation thereof." King 1, 694 F.2d 674, 677
(11th Cir. 1983).
91. 496 F. Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
92. Id at 1106.
93. Id. at 1108.
94. 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981).
95. Id. at 222.
96. Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 444, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1968).
97. Factors, 579 F.2d at 222.
[Vol. 20
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him "newsworthy. '98 The second circuit's reply in Factors was:
"We cannot accept Pro Arts contention that the legend 'IN MEM-
ORY. . .' placed its poster in the same category as one picturing
a presidential candidate, albeit a mock candidate." 99 However, it
is hard to believe the court seriously thought Paulsen's mock can-
didacy was somehow more newsworthy than Elvis Presley's death.
The practice of forcing a case into the commercial category is
perhaps best illustrated in Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v. Day
& Night Co.,10 0 where the defendants' production, "A Day in
Hollywood/A Night in the Ukraine," used the Marx Brothers
characters only in the second half of the play. 101 The court found
the play constituted "entertainment that merely imitates,"'
02
which "even if skillfully and accurately carried out, does not re-
ally have its own creative component and does not have a signifi-
cant value as pure entertainment."' 10 3
The decisions which weigh the merit and creativity of differing
works have led one commentator to recognize that "more consti-
tutional interest in 'mere' commercial appropriations of the celeb-
rity's name and image exists than has been previously
suggested."' 4 Indeed, the purchasers of commercial goods, the
general public, are often exercising their protected rights of speech
by exhibiting their heroes and villains in the form of commercial
products. 05 Finally, in attempting to ascertain the motives of the
person who is exploiting another's right of publicity, it may be
impossible to separate the speech from the commercial element.1
0 6
Another commentator has gone so far as to suggest that Zacchini
v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.'0 7 involved a "purely com-
mercial"' 03 setting, although Zacchini involved the appropriation
of a newsworthy event.
Given the alternative, the desire to categorize difficult cases as
involving commercial appropriations is understandable. It is eas-
98. Id.
99. Id
100. 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
101. Id., 523 F. Supp. at 486.
102. Id. at 492-93.
103. Id at 493 (footnote omitted) (quoting Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F.
Supp. 1339, 1359 (D.N.J. 1981)). "The court reached an unjustifiable conclusion. An
original play, with new music, lyrics and script must have enough original creativity
to merit first amendment protection. By deciding otherwise, the court may have de-
nied the public the opportunity to enjoy 'A Day in Hollywood, A Night in the
Ukraine " Id Note, Reconciling, supra note 47, at 995.
104. Sims, Survivability, supra note 15, at 497.
105. Id. at 494-95.
106. See Note, Reconciling, supra note 47, at 989-90.
107. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
108. Hoffman, Courts' Nightmare, supra note 53, at 23.
1984]
16
California Western Law Review, Vol. 20 [2016], No. 3, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol20/iss3/3
CALIFORNIA WESTERAN LAW REVIEW
ier to judge the merit of a work than to judge the merit of the first
amendment itself, which is generally thought to come into play
when the name, likeness or characteristics of an individual appear
in an entertaing or informative work.10 9
In Hicks v. Casablanca Records,11 the plaintiffs attempted to
prevent the defendants from publishing a fictional account of Ag-
atha Christie's mysterious eleven day disappearance in 1926.111
The court found that the book was not protected as a biogra-
phy.112 Neither the book nor the movie were protected as news or
history.113 The court noted that other courts had engaged in a
balancing test between society's interest in the speech and those
interests seeking to restrain it.114 The court cited Miller v. Caiffor-
nia,115 and Near v. Minnesota,1 6 and found that the right of pub-
licity does not attach "where a fictionalized account of an event in
the life of a public figure is depicted in a novel or movie, and in
such novel or movie it is evident to the public that the events so
depicted are fictitious."' "17
Citations to cases utilizing a balancing test, without recognizing
the factual differences of those cases, are of little help in formulat-
ing a standard in right of publicity cases. Neither case is on point.
In Near, the defendants had been convicted under a Minnesota
statute which provided "for the abatement, as a public nuisance,
of a 'malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine
or other periodical.' "118 The Court found that although liberty of
the press is not an absolute right, this statute was designed not to
punish but to suppress the offending newspaper. 19 Near, then,
involved the government's suppression of undesirous speech in the
109. See Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981); Hicks v.
Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Guglielmi v. Spelling-
Goldberg Prod., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 862, 603 P.2d 454, 455, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352, 353 (1979)
(Bird, C.J., concurring).
110. 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
111. Id. at 429.
112. Id. at 430-31.
113. Id. at 431.
114. Id
115. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
116. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
117. Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
118. Near, 283 U.S. at 701-02.
119. Id at 711. See also Justice Butler's dissenting opinion, at 732 (quoting J.
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1880 (5th
ed. 1891)):
That this amendment was intended to secure to every citizen an absolute
right to speak, or write, or print whatever he might please, without any re-
sponsibility, public or private, therefor, is a supposition too wild to be in-
dulged by any rational man. This would be to allow every citizen a right to
destroy at his pleasure the reputation, the peace, the property, and even the
personal safety of every other citizen.
[Vol. 20
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form of prior restraint upon publication by the press relating to
the malfeasance of public officers-"the essence of censorship." 120
The Court found that the chief purpose of the guarantee of liberty
of the press is to prevent prior restraints on publication. 12'
Miller v. California,22 on the other hand, involved the applica-
tion of California's obscenity statute 23 to a situation where un-
willing recipients had received sexually explicit materials.12 4 The
Court replaced the "utterly without redeeming social value"
test 25 with an inquiry into "whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."' 26
Miller is inapposite, as obscene material is entirely unprotected by
the first amendment. 27
Chief Justice Bird of the California Supreme Court also
reached the first amendment issues in a concurring opinion in
Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions,2 8 involving an exhibi-
tion of the film Legend of Valentino: A Romantic Fiction.129 The
Chief Justice concluded that a film, whether exhibited on televi-
sion or in theaters, is presumptively protected under the Califor-
nia and United States Constitutions, 30 and will forfeit that
protection only if it falls within narrowly limited classes of
cases.'
3
'
The Chief Justice relied on the primary goal of the first amend-
ment, "to remove governmental restraints from the arena of pub-
lic discussion,"' 32 to invalidate the right of publicity claim in a
fictional work.133 Chief Justice Bird also relied upon Justice
120. Near, 283 U.S. at 713.
121. Id.
122. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
123. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 311, 311.2 (West 1970).
124. Miller, 413 U.S. at 18.
125. Id at 24. See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966) (plurality
opinion) (utterly without redeeming social value).
126. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
127. Id at 23.
128. 25 Cal. 3d 860, 865-72, 603 P.2d 454, 457-62, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352, 356-60
(1979) (Bird, C.J., concurring).
129. Id. at 862, 603 P.2d at 455, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
130. U.S. CONST. amends. I & XIV; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2.
131. Guglielmi, 25 Cal. 3d at 864-65, 603 P.2d at 457-58, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 355-56
(citing, inter alia, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-90 (1969),
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952), and Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942)).
132. Id. at 866, 603 P.2d at 458, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 356 (quoting Cohen v. Califor-
nia, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971)).
133. But see Sims, Survivability, supra note 15, at 485 n.152: "Notably, state pro-
tection of publicity rights does not represent a suppression of ideas by government
motivated by fear of their communicative impact on the listener--the type of regula-
tion that the Court has voided. .. ."
1984]
18
California Western Law Review, Vol. 20 [2016], No. 3, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol20/iss3/3
CALIFORNIA WESTERIN LAW REVIEW
Brandeis' concurring opinion in Whitney v. California,134 and
Nimmer, The Right to Speak From Times to Time. First Amend-
ment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy,3 5 for
support.'3 6
Justice Brandeis' concurrence in Whitney, however, dealt with
the California Criminal Syndicalism Act, 137 which punished an
accused "not for contempt, incitement or conspiracy, but for a
step in preparation, which, if it threatens the public order at all,
does so only remotely."' 38 Whitney thus afforded another in-
stance of a state attempting to regulate speech to ensure its own
safety.' 39 Once again, the primary goal of the first amendment
was stressed, as is shown by this quote from Thomas Jefferson's
First Inaugural Address: "If there be any among us who would
wish to dissolve this union or change its republican form, let them
stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of
opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it." 140
The only decision to date which balanced the right of publicity
and the right of free speech and found that the right of publicity
prevailed is Estate of Presley v. Russen.'4' Russen involved the
rights of the defendant to promote and present a theatrical pro-
duction "designed to imitate or simulate a stage performance of
Elvis Presley."' 42 The court explicitly noted that a distinction be-
tween the protection afforded to news as opposed to entertain-
ment had been noted by commentators, 43 but did not indicate
that it would afford fictional books or movies any less protection
than news. 144
The court instead admitted that defendant's production did not
entirely qualify as either purely commercial use or entertain-
ment. 45 Although it contained "an informational and entertain-
134. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
135. Nimmer, The Right to Speak From Times to Time: First Amendment Theory
Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REV. 935, 949 (1968) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Nimmer, Times].
136. Guglielmi, 25 Cal. 3d at 866 n.7, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 356 n.7, 603 P.2d at 458 n.7.
137. 1919 Cal. Stats., c. 188, p. 281 (repealed by 1953 Cal. Stats., c. 32, p. 641;
current version at CAL. PENAL §§ 11400-02 (West 1982)).
138. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 373 (Brandeis, J. concurring).
139. Id. at 376.
140. Id. at 375 n.2.
141. 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981).
142. Id. at 1344.
143. Id. at 1355-56, 1356 n.12 (citing Felcher & Rubin, Portrayal, supra note 15, at
1596-1601). The court ignored, however, Felcher & Rubin's statement that "[lthis
tendency toward differential treatment is tempered, however, by the hesitation of
courts to make fine distinctions in cases in which free speech issues are involved."
Felcher & Rubin, Portrayal, supra note 15, at 1598.
144. Estate of Presley, 513 F. Supp. at 1357-58.
145. Id. at 1358-59.
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ment element,"' 46 the show primarily sought to commercially
exploit Elvis Presley. 147 Although entertainment generally enjoys
first amendment protection, 48 the court concluded that imitation
"does not really have its own creative component and does not
have a significant value as pure entertainment."'
49
It is unfortunate that the court, after balancing the right of pub-
licity and the goals of the first amendment, stopped short of say-
ing that the right of publicity will prevail in a balancing test
involving any type of nonnewsworthy, entertainment material,
and instead relied on a facile distinction between "imitation" and
"pure entertainment," an as yet undefined, and perhaps undefina-
ble, concept.
There is support for the proposition that the balancing of the
right of publicity and the first amendment should be more heavily
weighted towards the first amendment when the primary goal of
avoiding government suppression of undesirous speech is present.
In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,150 zoning ordinances
adopted by the City of Detroit differentiated between motion pic-
ture theatres which exhibited sexually explicit movies and those
which did not.' 51 A plurality of the Court 52 found that the insidi-
ous element of selective government controls is "It]he sovereign's
agreement or disagreement with the content of what a speaker has
to say.' 5 3
The plurality concluded that availability of first amendment
protection may depend on the speech's content. 54 Some speech
receives no protection;155 and even protected speech may require a
different governmental response, if prompted by a difference in
content. 56 The vital element is governmental neutrality:
Such a line may be drawn on the basis of content without
146. Id. at 1359.
147. Id.
148. Id. (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578
(1977); Southeastern Prod., Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557-58 (1975); Joseph Bur-
styn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952)).
149. Estate of Presley, 513 F. Supp. at 1359. The court also quoted Zacchini for
the proposition that, to some degree, defendant had appropriated the very activity, a
live stage show, by which Elvis Presley created his reputation. Id. at 1361. However,
it is doubtful that the taking here approximated the taking in Zacchini, The only
taking was by imitating Presley's past performances. Nonetheless, Zacchini left the
courts to do the line drawing in cases involving appropriations of less than an entire
act. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. at 574-75.
150. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
151. Id. at 52. But see Kulzick & Hogue, Chilled Bird, supra note 57, at 61.
152. (Stevens, J., joined by Burger, CJ., White and Rehnquist, JJ.).
153. Young, 427 U.S. at 64.
154. Id. at 65-66.
155. Id.
156. Id at 66 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
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violating the government's paramount obligation of neutrality
in its regulation of protected communication. For the regula-
tion of the places where sexually explicit films may be exhibited
is unaffected by whatever social, political, or philosophical
message a film may be intended to communicate; whether a
motion picture ridicules or characterizes one point of view or
another, the effect of the ordinances is exactly the same. 157
A test which would allow a "newsworthiness" privilege in right
of publicity cases, and deny any privilege in entertainment cases,
would also be government-neutral. The right of publicity would
be enforced in entertainment cases and not in cases involving
privilege, whether or not the government liked the message the
work attempted to convey. As stated earlier, 158 enforcement of
the right of publicity will only impinge slightly on the first amend-
ment, and certainly the right to protect one's property is at least as
valid a state right as the right to protect one's feelings which is
recognized in state libel law. 159 As opposed to the New York
Times160 standard, there would be no difference between viola-
tions of public and private figures' rights of publicity, 161 and the
protection afforded newsworthy information would be
absolute. 162
CONCLUSION
The right of publicity should not be forfeited because a person
while living does not commercially exploit the right. Nonforfeit-
ure will promote the policy of preventing unjust enrichment. 63
Since the right to publicity is a property right, the right should be
assignable and devisable, ensuring increased productivity. State
and federal courts, where appropriate, should define the limits of
the right, which should be limited to life plus fifty years. 164
157. Id at 70. Justice Powell left the question for another day, stating it was possi-
ble that the decision was justified on the basis of the government's ability to tailor its
reaction to different types of speech depending on the degree to which its rights are
implicated. Id at 82 n.6 (Powell, J., concurring).
158. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
159. See Nimmer, Times, supra note 135, at 949 n.46.
160. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
161. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347-48, 351 (1974).
162. A publication involving newsworthy information, however, may pass into the
realm of commercial exploitation of a person's right of publicity. See, e.g., Cher v.
Forum Int'l, Ltd., 692 F.2d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 3089
(1983), where the court erroneously applied the New York Times standard. Cher had
not alleged that the interview was false or defamatory. Id. at 637. The issue was
simply whether Cher's name and likeness were used as an endorsement of Forum
without her permission. Either Cher's permission was obtained or it was not, and if it
was not obtained, it matters little whether Forum's advertising staff knew it did not
have permission, or recklessly failed to ascertain whether it had such permission.
163. See supra notes 11-30 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 31-52 and accompanying text.
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Although reasons for protecting the right are similar to those of
copyright law, the right is not protected under the Copyright Act,
hence it is not preempted. The right must not be circumvented by
improper use of the Copyright Act. 65 Finally, the right should
prevail over first amendment challenges in all areas other than the
area of newsworthy information. Such enforcement by the states
is government-neutral, and will only minimally affect the goals of
the first amendment. 66
165. See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 62-161 and accompanying text.
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